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MEDIA NEUTRALITY IN THE DIGITAL ERA
A STUDY OF THE PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING ISSUES
Huei-ju Tsai'
Introduction
Due to the unexpectedly rapid development of technology, the issues regarding intellectual
property rights have grown considerably, particularly in the field of copyright. Following the
development of technology, the scope of copyright has been adjusted and expanded. The whole
world emphasizes copyright protection; nevertheless, the outcry over public domain is palpable.
Copyright owner's interest and the public's interest have been in tension since the origin of the
legal concept of copyright. How can the law strike a balance between the copyright and the
public domain? The fair use doctrine plays a significant role in the balance between these two
competing interests.
Copyright law always keeps pace with the development of technology. In a digital world, the
issues are the following: Does the attitude toward the copyright in the digital era differ from the
attitude in the traditional technology world, such as print, cassette tapes, TV and radio? Is it
appropriate to establish regulations for new technology based on those of prior technology?
The principle of media neutrality, which was derived from Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. ("Sony")I and developed in RJAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.
("Diamond")2, may solve these thorny issues.
This note starts with a brief introduction to the fair use doctrine and its role in the digital age.
Then the note traces the development of the media neutrality principle from two precedents -
Sony and Diamond. Thereafter, the note takes P2P (Peer-to-peer technology) file-sharing cases,
including two pending cases in Taiwan - ezPeer and KURO, as examples. Based on the
differences between the legal systems and practices between the U.S. and Taiwan, the note
discusses the possible directions of ezPeer and KURO from the viewpoints of the prosecutors, the
defendants, the courts and the public policy. At last, a media-neutrality-centered approach may
address the P2P issues.
Huei-ju Tsai is a senior judge in the Family Court, the Taipei District Court, Taiwan, and graduated with a
LLM degree from the John Marshall Law School, Chicago, in January 2005.
l 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir., 1999).
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I. The Foundation of Copyright
Copyright owners have the right to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute to the
public, and to perform and display publicly.3 From the founding of copyright law, copying has
always been at the center of copyright. It is copies, rather than originals, that concern copyright
owners. Thus, copyright can be broadly described as a right of control over copying of the work.4
Before the invention of paper and the printing press, the price or value of a work had mainly
depended on the cost of copying, rather than on the precise idea in the work. This was due to the
extremely high cost of copying by hand. It had not been necessary to worry about protecting
copyright because of the actual difficulties in copying.
5
After the printing press was invented and used as copying equipment, copyright protection
arose, in general, due to business interests of publishers. 6 With improved copying technology,
such as the printing press, photocopiers, video tape recorders, computers and the Internet, copy
quality has improved while the cost of copying has declined. Information technologies and
communications techniques have exploded onto the market. Meanwhile, copyright laws have
also been modified to adjust to the changes which technology has brought to copyright. Hence,
copyright and technology have always been in tension.7 Although technology can easily infringe
copyright, technology can also offer better protection to copyright owners than they might
imagine.
8
Copyright protection, which only offers incentives for authors to create, is different from the
protection afforded to ordinary or tangible property because of the non-exclusive and
"non-rivalrous" nature of ideas.9 Natural scarcity does not exist in ideas. Everyone can share the
other's idea without diminishing its power.10 Therefore, Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, the Copyright Clause, provides:
The Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
17 U.S.C. §106.
4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 124 (1999). PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 4 (2003).
5 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 124-25.
6 Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 430. Professor Goldstein described the origin of copyright in England and the U.S.A. in detail.
See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29-61 (describing the origin of copyright in England and the U.S. in detail).
7 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 124-25.
8 Id., at 127.
9 Id., at 132-33.
0 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY 15 (2001).
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securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their writings and
discoveries. 
11
The Copyright Clause explicitly empowers Congress to bargain with copyright owners on
behalf of the public. This is based on the metaphor of quid pro quo.12 The drafters of the
Constitution intended to motivate authors to create by offering them a limited reward, and then to
have the creative works available to the public after the exclusive right had expired. 13 In order to
supply incentives for authors to produce more works, the public agrees to grant a limited-time
monopoly to authors as a reward for their creativity. 14 For their part, authors promise to allow the
public to freely exploit their works after the copyright has expired. 15 This "trade-off'
demonstrates a bargain and balance between private copyright protection and the public domain.16
There are two schools of copyright metaphysicians: copyright optimists and copyright
pessimists. Copyright optimists insist that copyright is based on natural justice, and that the
copyright's cup, which is half-full, needs to be filled. Copyright pessimists, on the other hand,
contend that owners should control copies to induce them to create, but that copyright should
protect only to the extent necessary, otherwise the public is unable to express its own wishes.'
7
In order to simultaneously encourage creation and maintain the public domain, the
"copyright's cup" ought to be half empty. That is, copyright protection is provided to the extent
necessary in order to give a necessary incentive to authors. Because copyright laws not only
protect copyright owners, but also, and more importantly, advance the public interest, "the
progress of science and useful arts" cannot occur if the copyright's cup is full. 18 Some
commentators emphasize the economic incentives of copyright from the view of the economic
analysis of law. They focus solely on how to increase the economic incentives to create works,
but do not take the public into account. 19 The key point in resolving copyright issues, nonetheless,
is to always keep the public interest in mind.
II. Fair Use and New Technology
U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
12 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 78 (2001).
13 Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 429.
14 LESSIG, supra note 4 , at 133-34; LITMAN, supra note 12, at 78-79.
15 LESSIG, id., at 133.
16 LESSIG, id., at 133-34; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 20-21, 23, 44; LITMAN, supra note 12, at 78-79.
17 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 10-11.
18 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 129.
19 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 79-80.
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The Copyright Act grants a bundle of rights to copyright owners. However, there are two
exceptions to the broad copyright. First, there is the "first sale" doctrine, which holds that after
the copyrighted work is sold, the original copyright owner can no longer control the distribution of
this work. The other exception is the "fair use" doctrine, which exempts certain types of
unauthorized usage of copyrighted works from copyright infringement liability.2 0 The protection
granted to copyright owners is held with certain limitations under the public interest, one of which
is fair use. Generally speaking, copyright owners can control how the public uses copyrighted
works. The public, however, can access and use copyrighted works under the fair use doctrine.
2 1
Fair use, which serves as a critical defense in copyright infringement cases, is a made law.
2 2
In Folsom v. Marsh23, Judge Joseph Story held that in determining whether the secondary use of
the copyrighted work was justified, courts must examine "the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.,
2 4
The fair use doctrine evolved from precedents and was then codified in Section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976.25 The section provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work does not
constitute an infringement of copyright.2 6 When determining whether an unauthorized use of a
work is exempted from copyright infringement, courts must consider all four Folsom factors: "(1)
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.,
2 7
The principle of fair use originated, because it was impossible to monitor and measure every
28unauthorized copying , and transaction costs of negotiation between copyright owners and users
were high.2 9  Due to such inconveniences, the "implied consent" of copyright owners to
20 Id., at 17-18.
21 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 134.
22 EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 191 (2000).
23 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
24 Id., at 348.
25 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 27.
26 17 U.S.C. §107.
27 Id.
28 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 137.
29 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 201.According to Professor Harper, fair use allows the copier to avoid the
transactional costs associated with fee negotiations between the copier and the copyright owner. Professor Harper
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unauthorized acts is presumed. Congress and courts permit the existence of fair use on behalf of
the public interest. Moreover, fair use is also applied to the "enforced-consent" situation in
which copyright owners are unwilling to allow the public to use the copyrighted works.
30
When technology improves, measuring each use of the works becomes no longer difficult.
However, it does not mean that fair us is of no use. 3 1 New technology probably influences the
balance between copyright owners and the public, while fair use is critical to rebuild the scope of
copyright and the public domain. Every new technological development reignites the debate as
to whether the scope of copyright under the existing copyright system extends to this new
technology. 32  When deciding new technology cases, which the Copyright Act had never
addressed before, the courts always employed the principle of fair use to resolve these thorny
issues. 33  The most remarkable example is the Sony Betamax case: Sony v. Universal City
Studio.34 Subsequently, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc.35 reaffirmed the principle
established in Sony.
A. Sony v. Universal City Studio: Time-Shifting
Video tape recorders (VTRs) were first produced in the 1950s, but they became widely used
for home recording within the next two decades. 36  Sony manufactured and sold its VTR product,
Betamax, in 1975. 37 Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions filed suit against Sony
production in 1976. 38 The plaintiffs alleged that Betamax owners, who had used the Betamax to
record the plaintiffs' television programs, infringed their copyright in these programs. 39 They
summarized that fair use allows users not to get permission from authors and pay a fee to authors. There are costs
involved in the transaction cost of the fee: (1) to find out who the author is; (2) to contact the author; (3) to negotiate
with the author about the fee; and (4) to arrange how to pay the fee. See Georgia Harper, Will We Need Fair Use in the
Twenty-FirstCentury? (Aug. 31, 2001), at < http:iwww.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualpropertivfair use.htm> (last
visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
30 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 84.
31 Professor Harper suggested that in the new electronic environment, the focus of fair use should be shifted to
another alternative: "a more cooperative exploration" which enables authors, publishers and users to benefit from
copyrighted material. See Harper, supra note 29.
32 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 23.
33 SAMUELS, supra note 22, at 200; Megan E. Gray and & Will Thomas DeVries, The Legal Fallout from Digital
Rights Management Technology, 20-24 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 20 (April, 2003).
34 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
31 180 F. 3d 1072 ( 9th Cir., 1999).
36 SAMUELS, supra note 22, at 66.
37 Id.
38 id.
39 Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
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further alleged that Sony, who had provided users with the infringing facilities, the VTRs, should
be liable for contributory infringement.
40
The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that users'
noncommercial home taping of TV programs constituted fair use.4 1 The court first found that the
programs were broadcast free to the public, and that the recording conduct happened at home.
42
Then the court found that the recorders simply increased access to programs, but did not reduce
the market of the plaintiffs' works.43 Even if the home taping could not be regarded as fair use,
the court concluded that Sony did not share liability for users' unauthorized taping because users
had the right to do anything they liked, and Sony could not get involved.44
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the home taping by users
was not fair use because the home taping, whose primary purpose was to record commercial
programs, was not a productive use and it would diminish the market for the plaintiffs' works.
45
The Circuit Court then reasoned that VTRs were used to reproduce TV programs, so they were not
for any substantial non-infringing use.46 Writ of certiorari was granted in 1982 (457 U.S. 1116).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Sony's conduct did not constitute contributory infringement
because the Betamax was capable of significant non-infringing uses. 47 The majority reasoned
that the staple article of the commerce doctrine in the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. §271(c)) could be
applied to copyright cases. 48  The Court first recognized that the Copyright Act had never
"accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work., 49 As to
authorized time-shifting, the Court found that many producers of television programs had no
objection to the practice of time-shifting for private home use.50  With regard to unauthorized
time-shifting, the Court then reasoned that private home taping done to shift the time when the
programs were viewed was a noncommercial and non-for-profit use, and that the plaintiffs had not
proven actual present harm or potential future harm by such use. Therefore, there were
40 Id. at 419.
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAm., 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 (C.D.Cal. 1977).
42 Id., at 442, 450.
4, Id., at 452, 456.
44 Id, at 461..
45 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAm., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. Cal. 1981).
46 Id, at 975.
47 Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
48 Id, at 442.
49 Id.
50 Id., at 443-47.
51 Id., at 447-56.
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substantial non-infringing uses for the Betamax, and Sony could not be held liable for
contributory infringement committed by some users as a result of selling them such equipment.
52
B. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems: Space-Shifting
The plaintiff, RIAA, sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant, Diamond
Multimedia Systems Inc., from producing and selling the Rio portable music players by which
users could download MP3 files from computers and listen to them anywhere. 53 RIAA alleged
that the Rio did not use a Serial Copyright Management System (SCMS), and thus it was not
qualified as a device under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C § 1001 et seq.
54
The Ninth Circuit Court cited the Sony case and found that the copies made by the Rio were
only the files, which users "space-shift[ed]" from their computers to portable music players.
55
Hence, the court concluded that such copying constituted a noncommercial personal use.5' As a
result, in Diamond, the Circuit Court developed the idea of "space-shifting" based on the
"time-shifting" concept in Sony.
III. The Concept of Media Neutrality
The statement of Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, "the medium is the message," stands
for the proposition that the effects imposed by the means or manner of communication are greater
than those conveyed by the message itself.57 Because a medium transmits a message to recipients,
the effects that the message creates depend not only on the content of the message, but also on how
many recipients the medium can reach. The more recipients the medium can reach, the more
influential the message. Messages conveyed by conventional media, such as handwriting, can
access only a limited number of recipients, while new technology such as print, telephone,
television, the computer, and the Internet, can transmit the message to more recipients in seconds.
Due to the profound influence that a message has on the recipients, a medium enhanced with new
52 Id., at 456.
53 RIAAv. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir., 1999).
54 Id., at 1073, 75.
55 Id., at 1079.
56 Id.
57 MARSHALL McLUHAN AND & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 8(Jerome Agel Coordinator, Bantam
Books) (1967) (published in 2001 by Gingko Press). See also Gray and & DeVries, supra note 33. Some scholars
disagree with Marshall McLuhan's statement about the relationship between media and messages, contending that the
medium and the message are totally distinct and that "everything we create purposefully is an expression in some
medium." See DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE 1 (2003).
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technology has more power than ever imagined.
Media neutrality means that a copyright owner enjoys the same protection in any form where
his work is fixed.58 The subject matter of media neutrality is material objects, like books,
periodicals, disks and tapes, as well as electric storage media, such as audiotapes, videotapes,
computer disks (CDs), and digital versatile disks (DVDs).59 In other words, the terms "medium",
"forms" or "manner" embrace not only "physical storage media" but also "systems of
communication or entertainment (the broadcast media)" or "modes of expression." 60  Moreover,
technology adopted in media plays an important role in conveying messages. In a digital world,
the progress of computer science technology has advanced the usage of media. Under this
interpretation, media neutrality can be broadly read as "technology neutrality."
61
This concept of media neutrality as technology neutrality arose from White-Smith Pub. Co. v.
Apollo Co.6 2 The plaintiff, White-Smith Pub. Co., claimed that piano rolls, which the defendant,
Apollo Co., had published in the form of sheet music, infringed the plaintiff's music copyright.63
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant was not liable because piano rolls were just parts
of a machine, duly operated by a skilled operator to make musical tones.64 The Court found that
the musical sounds combined to form an auditory reproduction, which did not come under
copyright protection because the Copyright Act, however, protected only visual reproductions.
65
White-Smith demonstrates the reluctance of courts to expand copyright protection to new
technology. 66 The holding pushed Congress to accept the concept of media neutrality by creating
the compulsory license system for recordings of music works in 1909 and modifying the definition
67of "work" in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act
of 1976 provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship
58 Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: Media Neutrality in Copyright, at 2, (drafted on Oct. 2003), at <
http://www.law.tulane.edu/WIPIP/papers/techtulane.pdf> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
59 Id., at 5.
60 Id., at 5-6.
61 Id., at 6.
62 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
63 [d., at 8-9.
64 Id., at 18.
65 Id., at 17-18.
66 Tussey, supra note 58, at 1. See also Sony v. Universal City Studio, 464 U.S. 417, at 431 (The Supreme Court
indicated that the protection of copyright is expanded only under explicit intent of the Congress.)
67 Tussey, supra note 58, at 1, n7.
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fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 'now known or later developed', from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.
The language of Section 101 and 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly requires the
element of fixation-copyright protection stands either in existing or in future media. This is so
regardless of how works are perceived or communicated, whether directly or indirectly, through
machines or devices. In order to solve the challenges resulting from future technology, Congress
broadly embraces "any conceivable present and future uses of copyrighted works." 68  Thus,
media neutrality as expressed in the Copyright Act of 1976 totally overruled White-Smith.69 The
House Report indicated that this was the intent of Congress:
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may
be . . . whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed . .. , magnetic, or any
other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device "now known or later developed."
70
Under media neutrality, the subject matter of copyright includes works fixed on both existing
media and future media. The broad protection encourages authors to create more works and thus
advance the progress of science and useful arts. Such an incentive matches the ultimate goal of
the Copyright Act. Media neutrality not only makes the Copyright Act stay neutral, rather than
favoring any specific technology, but it also directs courts to interpret the Copyright Act as new
technology develops. 71 Thus, the purpose of media neutrality is to shape a more flexible
copyright law to fit new technology without repeatedly revising the copyright law in the future.
72
The above explanation of media neutrality represents the view of copyright owners. The next
section will discuss other points of view of the media neutrality principle.
IV. The Dilemma between Copyright Law and New Technology
Basically, copyright laws were first premised on print media, and then expanded to
68 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 883 (1987).
69 Tussey, supra note 58, at 2-3.
70 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
71 Id., at 2-6.
72 Id., at 2-5. See also Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Rreemergence of Misappropriation and
Other Common Law Theories of Protectionfor Intellectual Property, 11 IHARV. J. L. & TECH 401, 427 (1998).
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photocopiers, broadcast, tapes, films, video taps, and digital media.73 Of course, there are many
debates about whether new legislation should be enacted specifically for digital media.74 It is,
however, too early to draw such a conclusion without further observing how the Internet develops.
Under the principle of media neutrality, the existing copyright protection system should still be
sufficient to fix the problems arising from digital media.
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, Justice Stewart held that the ultimate aim of the
incentive in the copyright law is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good" and
that the Copyright Act must be interpreted under the basic purpose to solve literal ambiguity
rendered by technology changes. 75 However, the exclusive rights of authors would undermine
the creativity of the public because the public is barred from using the copyrighted works, which
might stimulate the spark of creativity. 76 Furthermore, new technology for reproducing and
disseminating copyrighted works greatly challenges the Copyright Act. 77 It is necessary to figure
out a resolution to deal with the difficulties resulted from the exclusive nature of copyright and the
development of new technology.
In the beginning, material on the Internet was made available to the public free of charge.
Many authors made their original works accessible, and plenty of net users shared information on
the Internet. As a result, the Internet became a mass medium because of the World Wide Web.78
The Internet and digital media enhance freedom of expression and access to information. 79 The
nature of the Internet is one that is open and available to the public. From the history of
development of player piano rolls, phonograph records, jukeboxes, video tape recorders,
photocopiers, and cable television, when copyright laws have made exemptions for new
technology, the related industries have flourished80 because these new technology have created
another new market for copyrighted works. As the Internet has become a mass medium, the
media neutrality principle should apply to the issues on the Internet as well.
The Sony opinion, which is related to time-shifting and the staple article of commerce doctrine,
is a landmark decision of the fair use theory. The Sony court firmly struck down copyright owners
73 Id., at 31. Keller, supra note 72, at 31.
74 Some contend that recent technology differs from the conventional media so that copyright laws cannot handle it
any more. Others insist that copyright laws always deal with new technology well. See Keller, id., at 35.
75 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
76 Harper, supra note 29.
77 Tussey, supra note 58, at 14.
78 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 103-04.
79 Tussey, supra note 58, at 12.
80 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 106-07.
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who had kept trying to extend the monopoly right to new technology. 81 The concept of
space-shifting in Diamond achieved the same purpose.82 The narrow interpretation of copyright
to accommodate new technology both in Sony and in Diamond is consistent with media
neutrality. 83 Further, any new technology used as a personal tool to copy or disseminate should be
shielded under the media neutrality doctrine. Likewise, under media neutrality, the
characteristics of the Internet-speedy and costless transmission of information all over the
world-will permit more and more materials that inspire potential authors to create more original
works.
84
Some commentators describe the Sony case (analog video recording) as the first war between
Hollywood (the entertainment industry) and the Silicon Valley (the technology industry). 85 The
second one, they contended, is the MPEG3 audio recording. 86 The media neutrality principle not
only determines the scope of copyright, but also applies to the range of the public domain for the
public and media or technology providers. In other words, the law and the courts can strike a
balance between copyright owners and the public with media neutrality. The following section
will discuss the current topic of P2P file-sharing and try to solve the dilemma between the
Copyright Act and new technology.
V. The Argument of P2P File-Sharing
A. The Basic Conception of P2P
Traditionally, Internet content is provided by the "client-server" model in which a central
system, "the server," takes requests from a user, "the client," who asks for access to the
information or data, and then the server transmits the required content to the user.87 RIAA v.
MP3. corn is the leading case about this model.
Recently, the conventional "client-server" model has been replaced by peer-to-peer technology
81 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON &STANLEY W. LINDBERG, ET AL., THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS
219-20 (Athens: University of Georgia Press Nov. 1991).
82 The Diamond case mainly dealt with the new usage of new technology, the Rio portable players.
83 Tussey, supra note 58, at 14.
84 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 108.
85 Gary L. Benton, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Digital Copying War Between Hollywood And The
Silicon Valley, The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 18 (March, 2004, Northeast Edition).
86 Id.
8 William Fisher and & Christopher Yang, Peer-to-Peer Copying (Nov. 18, 2001), at
<http://cyber. law.harvard.edu/ilawiP2P.html > (last visited on July 22, 2004).
88 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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(a.k.a "P2P"), which initiates the direct connection among individual personal computers. On
one hand, P2P is extremely popular all over the world because of its features of convenience,
flexibility, and high quality with low-cost. On the other hand, P2P is severely challenging the
core of the Copyright Act. Music and film industries, in particular, are trying to fight P2P
technology through enforcement of copyright laws.
89
There are two types of P2P: the modified P2P system and the pure P2P mode. The modified
P2P system still contains a central system, such as Napster, ezPeer and KURO. 90 The ending of
Napster has contributed to the development and popularization of second-generation P2P
systems-the pure P2P mode, 91 which operates totally without an intervening server. The first
well-known system of the pure P2P mode is Gnutella. In addition, FastTrack, developed by a
Dutch company, is the most sophisticated system and currently used by the most rapidly growing
new services: Grokster (based in Nevis, West Indies), Music City Networks (offering the widely
hailed "Morpheus" software), KaZaA, eDonkey and Grouper (allowing file-sharing within a
small group of people).92
B. The Client-Server Model
In RIAA v. MP3. corn, the defendant, MP3.com, launched its "My.MP3.com" service having
purchased tens of thousands of popular CDs in which the plaintiffs held the copyrights. 93 The
defendant, without authorization, copied the plaintiffs' CD recordings onto its computer servers so
as to be able to replay the recordings for its subscribers. 94 The service was provided as the
"Beam-it Service" 95 and the "Instant Listening Service." 96 MP3.com subscribers were then able
to access, via the Internet, from a computer anywhere in the world, copies of the plaintiffs'
recordings made by the defendant.
97
89 The following cases indicate how the industries fought with the new technology.
90 EzPeer and KURO are P2P websites that are operating in Taiwan. The related lawsuits will be discussed as below.
91 Fisher and &Yang, supra note 87.
92 Id. See also (Author?) Software Company to Offer Friends-only File Sharing, Oct. 4, 2004, at
<http:/ online.wxsi.com article, O,,SB 109684670650734905,00.html> (last visited on Oct. 12, 2004).
93 RIAA v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
94 Id.
95 A subscriber to MP3.com must prove that he already owns the CD version of the recording by inserting his copy of
the commercial CD into his computer CD-Rom drive for a few seconds. See MP3.com, id., at 350.
96 A subscriber to MP3.com must purchase the CD from one of defendant's cooperating online retailers. See id., at
350.
97 Id., at 350.
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The defendant argued that such copying is protected under the affirmative defense of "fair
use. ' 98 The court, however, held that such an argument was indefensible. 99 First, the court
reasoned that the defendant's purpose was unquestionably commercial and its services simply
repackaged the recordings to facilitate their transmission through another medium.' Such a
service added no new aesthetics, insights or understandings to the copyrighted music works, so it
did not constitute a "transformative space shift."''1 1 Then, the court recognized that the plaintiffs'
recordings were creative.10 2 The defendant totally copied and replayed the plaintiffs' works, and
the defendant's activities would reduce the plaintiffs' entry to the derivative market. 103
Therefore, the court concluded that there was no fair use and the defendant was liable for
copyright infringement. 1
04
To sum up, the server in a "client-server" model takes charge of all transmission of required
information from the server to the end user. Such an operation was the main reason why the
operator of a "client-server" website was held liable. Moreover, simply transmitting information
from one medium to another one can hardly be considered transformative. Thus, the owner of a
"client-server" model is unlikely to successfully invoke the fair use privilege in order to avoid
infringement liability. This example is completely consistent with the media neutrality principle.
C. The Modified P2P System
1. A&M Records v. Napster
l0 5
Napster was the designer and operator of a system that permitted PC users to transmit and
retain copyrighted sound recordings employing digital technology. 10 6 Through a process known
as P2P file sharing, Napster maintained a "search index" of a collective directory, and allowed each
user to create a "user library directory," which was stored on individual computer hard drives.
10 7
Users could access the user library directory to search for music files stored on other users'
computers, and transfer the desired copies from one computer to another via the Internet.1
0 8
98 Id.
99 Id., at 352.
100 Id., at 351.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id., at 352.
104 Id., at 352.
105 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
106 Id., at 1011.
107 Id., at 1012.
108 Id., at 1012.
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The plaintiff, RIAA, brought copyright infringement actions against Napster, alleging that
Napster users directly infringed the plaintiff's copyright, and that Napster should be liable under
the theories of contributory and vicarious infringement. 10 9 After evaluating the four factors set
forth in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
Napster's defense that its users engaged in fair use of the copyrighted material. 110 As to the
argument that Napster just provided samples of music, the court found that even though what
Napster users downloaded was a full, free and permanent copy, Napster adversely impacted the
plaintiff's audio CD and digital download markets. Thus, sampling did not meet the
requirements of fair use.
111
With regard to space-shifting, the court held that the model of shifting in Sony and Diamond
was different from that in Napster because the music files, which were listed on the Napster
system, are available to other Naspter users, not just to the single user himself. Therefore, there
was no fair use of space-shifting. 112 Next, the court upheld the district court's conclusion that
Napster may be secondarily liable for direct copyright infringement under two doctrines:
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. 113  As to the contributory copyright
infringement claim, the court concluded that Napster knowingly encouraged and assisted its users
to infringe the record companies' copyrights and that Napster materially contributed to infringing
activities. 114 As to the vicarious copyright infringement claim, the court concluded that Napster
had a direct financial interest in its users' infringing activities and that Napster retained the ability
to police its system for infringing activities. 
115
The court concluded, however, that the scope of the district court's preliminary injunction was
overbroad and remanded the case to the district court for modification of the injunction as follows:
Napster may be held liable for contributory copyright infringement only to the extent that Napster
knew of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions or sound recordings;
knew or should have known that the files were available on the Napster system; and failed to act to
prevent the distribution of the copyrighted material."16 Napster may further be held liable for
vicarious copyright infringement when it failed to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system
109 Id., at 1013.
110 Id., at 1014-17
1 Id., at 1018-19.
112 Id., at 1019.
113 Id., at 1020, 1024.
114 Id., at 1019-22.
115 Id., at 1022-24.
116 Id., at 1019-22.
5 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 59
Copyright © 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
and preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index."1
7
2. In Re Aimster
118
The plaintiff, RIAA, sued the defendant, John Deep, for contributory and vicarious
infringement, alleging that the defendant operated a website to offer "Aimster," later renamed as
"Madster," for his subscribers to swap digital copies of the plaintiff's popular music songs.119
The district court granted motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendant appealed. 1
20
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was the subscribers who made the copies of the
plaintiff's music and that the defendant just played a role as a stock exchange. 12 1 Thus, the
defendant was not a direct infringer. 122 Then the court distinguished Sony from the case at bar. 1
23
In Sony, the Betamax video recorder had been used in three manners: (1) for "time-shifting" (the
owner of the Betamax wanted to watch the programs later); (2) for "library building" (users used
the Betamax to retain the copies of the programs); and (3) for "commercial-skipping" (people
skipped commercials while watching the programs recorded by the Betamax.) 124  The first
manner constituted fair use, while the other two did not. 125 There were both infringing and
non-infringing uses for the Betamax. 126 Sony could not control the way the buyers used it.
127
As a result, Sony was not liable for the buyers' infringing activities. 
128
On the other hand, the court found that the defendant took copyrighted music as an example of
file-sharing in his tutorial which was an "invitation to infringement."' 129  Moreover, the monthly
fee of "Aimster" differed from the free nature of television programs in Sony. 130 Thus, the court
shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant and asked the defendant to prove that
his service was used in a substantial non-infringing manner.131
117 Id., at 1027-29.
"' 334 F.3d 643 (7 th Cir. 2003).
119 Id., at 645.
120 id..
121 Id., at 646-47.
122 id..
123 Id., at 649-50.
124 Sony, 464 U.S. at 422-24, 447-456.
125 Id., at 454-55.
126 Id., at 456.
127 Id., at 438, 442.
121 Id., at 456.
129 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
130 Id., at 652.
III Id., at 651-52.
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However, the court found that the defendant not only failed to prove that the "Aimster" service
had been used in a non-infringing manner, but he also tutored subscribers in how to use the service
to swap music files by encryption. 132 The safe harbor clause, 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(1)(A), did not
apply to this case due to the defendant's "ostrich-like" attitude toward the infringing use of his
service without taking any further preventive measures.133
In addition, the court rejected the argument that the injunction decreed by the district court
violated the defendant's freedom of speech based on Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft. 134 In Eldred, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the Copyright Act had already taken into account the First





The defendants, Global Digital Technology Co., Ltd. and its principal, Wu Yih-Dar, operated the
ezPeer website and charged the members for using ezPeer software and downloading other
members' files.138 Members downloaded a P2P software "ezPeer" from the website and installed
it in their personal computers. 139 After installing the ezPeer software, members could execute
ezPeer software to access ezPeer server.140
After checking the ezPeer member's validity, the master server recorded the information from
a specific file folder into the database in the "file name directory server." 141 Once the content of
such music folders was recorded in the database, any logged-on member could perform a keyword
search to quickly find the desired MP3 music files in the specific file folder.142 Then members
could click on the screen and select the desired files. 143 Their selections were then transmitted
through each computer's IP node to ezPeer's file name directory server.144 Thereafter, the server
establishes the direct ICP/IP link between two members' computer so as to enable the requesting
132 Id., at 650, 651, 653.
133 Id., at 654-55.
134 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
135 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-221.
136 Aimster 334 F.3d at 655-56.
137 The indictment of the Prosecutor's Office of the Shih Lin District Court, Taiwan, Case Number: 91 Jen Tzyh
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member to download the desired files. 1
45
On December 4, 2003, the operator of the ezPeer website and four ezPeer members who
connected to the ezPeer website and downloaded MP3 files through the ezPeer program, were
indicted by the Prosecutor's Office, Shih Lin District Court, Taiwan. 14 6 They were accused of
violating Paragraph 1 of Article 91147, Paragraph 1 of Article 92148 and 94149 of the Copyright Act
of Taiwan. As to the defendant, Global Digital Technology Company, the prosecutor
recommended using Paragraph 1 of Article 101 of the Copyright Act 150 to impose a fine under




The defendants, Fashion-now Co., Ltd. and its principal, So Tern Chen, operated two websites
that provided the P2P software for file sharing under the title of "KURO."'' 13  KURO members
used the software to download other members' files. (The connecting process of KURO is quite
similar to that of ezPeer, so no need to describe it in detail.)
5 4
On December 1, 2003, the operator of the KURO website and one KURO member who
connected to the KURO website and downloaded MP3 files through the KURO program, were
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 91, para. I provides: "A person who infringes on the economic rights of another
person by means of reproducing the work with intent to profit shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than
five years, detention, or in addition thereto a fine of not less than two hundred thousand and not more than two million
New Taiwan Dollars."Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (providing a translation of
the Copyright Act of Taiwan) (The following translated provisions of the Copyright Act of Taiwan are supplied by the
Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., available at <
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/e 1-4-1 an.asp >(last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).)
141 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 92, para. 1 provides: "A person who, with intent to profit, infringes on the economic
rights of another person by means of public recitation, public broadcast, public presentation, public performance,
public transmission, public display, adaptation, compilation, or leasing, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than three years, detention, or in addition thereto a fine of not more than seven hundred and fifty thousand New
Taiwan Dollars." Id..
149 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 94 provides: "A person who commits a crime specified in paragraph I or 2 of
Article 91, Article 91bis, Article 92, or Article 93 as a vocation shall be imprisoned for not less than one year and not
more than seven years, and in addition thereto, may be fined not less than three hundred thousand and not more than
three million New Taiwan Dollars." Id.
150Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 101, para. I provides: "Where the representative of a juristic person, or the agent,
employee, or other servant of a j uristic or natural person commits any of the offenses specified in Articles 91 through
96bis in the performance of its duties, in addition to punishing the infringer in accordance with the aforesaid articles,
such juristic or natural person shall also be fined in accordance with said articles." Id.
151 The Iindictment, supra note 137.
152 The indictment of the Prosecutor's Office of the Taipei District Court, Taiwan, Case Number: 92 Jen Tzyh
No. 16389/21865 (Dec. 1, 2003).
153 Id.
154 Id.
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indicted by the Prosecutor's Office, Taipei District Court, Taiwan.155 They have been accused of
violating Paragraph 1 of Articles 91, Paragraph 1 of 92 and 94 of the Copyright Act of Taiwan.1
5 6
As to Defendant Fashion-now Co., Ltd., the prosecutor recommends using Paragraph 1 of Article




In the Napster, Aimster, ezPeer and KURO website servers, there is a file-index directory that
can direct users to link with each other. That is the reason why the courts in Napster and Aimster
as well as the public prosecutors in ezPeer and KURO all considered the operators of these
websites to be liable. 15 8 Technologically, they are all featured as modified P2P models.
D. The Pure P2P Mode
1. KaZaA
KaZaA, owned by Sharman Networks Ltd. ("Sharman,") used P2P technology, "FastTrack,"
by which users connected to each other directly, without a need for a central point of
management. 5 9  What the user needed to do was to install KaZaA, which would then connect
the user to other users and search for the desired file. 160  The user could then download this file
directly from the other user's computer.
161
The plaintiff, Buma/Stemra, who protected the interests of the music industry, sued KaZaA for
distributing the software that allowed users to make copies of copyrighted works without
permission. 162 The plaintiff demanded that KaZaA distribution be stopped and that its owner
155 Id.
156 See supra note 147 to 150.
157 Supra note 152.
158 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646. ezPeer, supra note 137. KURO, supra note 152.
159 Sherman Networks, Peer-To-Peer (P2P) and How KMD Works, at
<http://www.kazaa.com/usihelp /lossary/p2p.htm> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004); Sherman Networks, How does
Kazaa work? What is Peer-To-Peer?, at
<http://www.sharmannetworks.com/content/view/full/83> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Anupam Chander, Next Stop, Kazaakhstan?: The Legal Globe-trotting Of Kazaa The Post-napster Filing Sharing
Company (Oct. 24, 2002), at <http:!iwrit.corporate.findlaw.comcommentarv/20021024 chander.html> (last visited
on Dec. 19, 2004); Magdalena Heim-Smith, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Since Napster (2002), at <
htt:'/sulawv.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa02/heim-smithi#a24> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004);
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(Sharman) pay royalties for the files transferred on the KaZaA network. 163 The plaintiff also
wanted the KaZaA's code to be modified in order to filter out copyrighted materials.1
64
On November 29, 2001, the District Court in Amsterdam held that KaZaA was liable for
copyright infringement and that KaZaA should take necessary measures to stop its users from
infringing the plaintiff's copyright and remove its site from the web. 165 On March 28, 2002,
however, the appellate court in Amsterdam dismissed the plaintiff's claim and concluded that
KaZaA was not liable for users' copyright infringement, because KaZaA's software had
substantive legitimate uses, such as trading jokes and personal photographs. 166 On December 19,
2003, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that P2P software, such as KaZaA, was legal
and upheld the appellate-court decision in Amsterdam. 1
67
A parallel case against Sharman is pending in the lower court in Los Angeles. 168  Sharman
initially argued that the U.S. court had no jurisdiction because Sharman had no assets in the U.S.,
and KaZaA spanned worldwide. 169 Recently, Sharman filed a countersuit, accusing that the
plaintiff violated antitrust laws by stopping Sharman and its partner from distributing authorized
copies of music and movies via KaZaA. 170  The antitrust claim was dismissed on September
171 1722003,'7' while the motion to dismiss the copyright claim was dismissed on January 16, 2004.
2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
173
The defendants, Grokster, Ltd., StreamCast Networks, Inc. (formerly known as MusicCity
Networks, Inc.), and KaZaA BV (formerly known as Consumer Empowerment BV), distributed
software that enabled users to exchange digital media via a peer-to-peer transfer network. 74
163 Anthony Deutsch, Court: Kazaa Not Responsible for Swapping (Dec 19, 2003), at <
http://www.techspot.com/vb/topic9660.html >(last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
164 Eric Bangeman, Kazaa Wins in European File-Sharing Court Battle( Dec 19, 2003), at
<http://www.arstechnica.comnewsiposts/1071870117.html >(last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
165 Chander, supra note 162; Heim-Smith, supra note 162.
166 Chander, supra note 162; Heim-Smith, supra note 162.
167 Deutsch, suspra note 163.; Bangeman, supra note 164
161 Chander, supra note 162; Heim-Smith, supra note 162.
169 Chander, supra note 162; Heim-Smith, supra note 162.
170 Chander, supra note 162; Heim-Smith, supra note 162.
171 12-9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. INTELL. PROP. 15 (Feb. 2, 2004).
172 As to the motion to dismiss the copyright claim, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., et al., No.
CV-01-08541-SVW, C.D. Calif. (2004).)
173 259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (C.D.Cal., 2003).
174 Id., at 1031-32.
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Each defendant distributed free software, which users could download free of charge. 175 All
three platforms were initially powered by FastTrack networking technology, but StreamCast later
employed the "open" (i.e., not proprietary) Gnutella technology.176 As a result, users of these
software platforms were essentially connected to the same peer-to-peer network and were able to
exchange files.
177
The plaintiffs, organizations in the motion picture and music recording industries, alleged that
the defendants were liable for copyright infringement committed by users of the defendants'
software. 178 The defendants argued, however, that they merely provided software to users and
that they were unable to control the use of their software.
179
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled on April 25, 2003, that the
defendants had no liability for the infringing behaviors of their users. 18 The court found that
there was no dispute about the fact that the defendants' software, Morpheus, was capable of both
infringing and substantial non-infringing uses. 181  The court then reasoned that Grokster did not
operate a centralized file-sharing network like that seen in Napster, because Grokster no longer
operated such a supernode, and that StreamCast's Gnutella was a "true" peer-to-peer network,
even more decentralized than FastTrack. 182 Subsequently, the court found that StreamCast did
not operate any of these directories. 183 Next, the court recognized that the defendants distributed
and supported the software, the users of which could and did choose to employ it for both lawful
and unlawful ends. 184 The court finally concluded that there was no evidence supporting any
active and substantial contribution to the infringement, and thus the defendants were not liable for
contributory infringement. 185 With regard to vicarious infringement, since there was no evidence
proving that the defendants were able to police users' infringing activities, the court concluded
that the defendants had absolutely no control over the software. 186 Therefore, the court held that
there was no vicarious liability in this case.
187
175 Id., at 1032.
176 Id.
177 Id., at 1032.
178 Id., at 1031.
179 id..
180 Id., at 1046.
181 Id., at 1035.
182 Id., at 1039-40.
183 Id., at 1042.
184 Id., at 1043.
185 Id., at 1043.
186 Id., at 1045.
187 Id., at 1043-46
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The plaintiffs appealed. On August 19, 2004, as to the present activities of the defendants,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the partial summary judgment of the district
court. 188 As to the previous versions of the software, the Circuit Court remanded the case for
further procedure. 189 The court reasoned that the software had substantive non-infringing uses
and that the plaintiffs did not prove the defendants had constructive knowledge of the infringement
committed by software users. 190 Thus, the defendants were not liable for contributory
infringement. 191 With respect to vicarious infringement, because the defendants had no right and




The free and open nature of P2P matches the primary goal of the Internet exactly. KaZaA did
not incur any legal liabilities for copyright infringement because of the independent way it
operated without main servers and its substantive legal uses, so were Gnutella and FastTrack in
Grokster.193 Basically, these cases were all based on the concept of "substantive non-infringing
uses" in Sony. In addition to swapping MP3 files, P2P can be utilized for many kinds of
substantive uses, such as photographs, movies, books, texts, videos, software and so on. 194 Other
than music and film industries, many industries, such as software industry, considerably concern
the courts' attitude toward P2P technology. That is the reason why the legal issues in the above
cases are drawing great attention nowadays.
188 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9 th Cir. 2004).
189 Id., at 1167.
190 Id., at 1161-63.
191 Id., at 1164.
192 Id., at 1166.
19' 380 F. 3d. at 1160.
194 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 181. See also Fisher and & Yang, supra note 87.
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E. Analysis Under Media Neutrality
The above sections introduced the doctrine of fair use and media neutrality, as well as the
cases related to P2P file-sharing. The debates about P2P file-sharing result from the
"decentralized and user-driven" characteristics of P2P, which influence the controls over copy and
distribution of copyrighted works. 195 The further issue is whether the media neutrality principle
can provide a better solution to the P2P file-sharing disputes.
1. Theoretical Analysis
Copyright strikes a balance between the competing interests of copyright owners and the
public. In reality, every copyright decision is directed not only by the statute but also by a specific
policy. What is the policy implied in the above decisions? The following session summarizes
the key factors in Sony, Diamond, Napster, Aimster, and Grokster.
Sony
1. Type of product manufactured or service provided




(1) Actus reus element
197
As to authorized time-shifting, the Supreme Court found that many producers of television
programs did not object to the practice of time-shifting for private home use.198 With regard to
unauthorized time-shifting, the Court reasoned that private home taping for time-shifting was
noncommercial and nonprofit and the plaintiffs had not proved that they incurred actual present
harm or potential future harm by such use. 199 Therefore, there were substantial non-infringing
uses in the Betamax.
200
(2) Mens rea element20 1 (There is no discussion about this part. "No discussion")
3. Vicarious infringement
(1) Actus reus element2°2 (No discussion)
195 Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 711-12 (2003); Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Aimster & MGM,
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 21, 26(2004).
196 SAMUELS, supra note 22, at 66.
197 The actus reus element of contributory infringement is causation, inducement, or material involvement in a
second party's infringement. See Miles, supra note 195, at 22.
19' 464 U.S. at 443-47.
199 Id., at 447-55.
200 Id., at 456.
201 The mens rea element of contributory infringement is knowledge. See id., at 22.
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(2) Mens rea element20 3 (No discussion)
4. The ruling
The majority held that Sony had not constituted to the infringement committed by some
204users.
Diamond
1. Type of product manufactured or service provided
Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc. produced and sold the Rio portable music players by
which users could download MP3 files from computers and listen to them anywhere.
20 5
2. Contributory infringement
(1) Actus reus element
The Ninth Circuit Court found that the copies made by the Rio were only the files, which
users "space-shifted" from their computers to portable music players.206 Hence, the court
concluded that such copying was noncommercial personal use.
207
(2) Mens rea element (No discussion)
3. Vicarious infringement
(1) Actus reus element (No discussion)
(2) Mens rea element (No discussion)
4. The ruling
The court developed the same idea of "space-shifting" based on the "time-shifting" concept
in Sony and thus held that Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc was not liable for the infringement
of the Rio users.208
Napster
1. Type of product manufactured or service provided
Napster was the designer and operator of a system that permitted PC users to transmit and
retain copyrighted sound recordings employing digital technology. 20 9  Through a process
known as P2P file sharing, Napster maintained a "search index" of a collective directory, and
202 The actus reus element of vicarious infringement is a direct financial interest in the second party's infringing
conduct. See id., at 23.
203 The mens rea element of vicarious infringement is the right and ability to supervise the infringing behavior. See
id., at 23.
204 464 U.S. at 456.
205 180 F. 3d at 1073.
206 Id., at 1079.
207 Id.
208 Id., at 1081.
209 239 F. 3d at 1011.
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allows each user to make a "user library directory," which was stored on individual computer
hard drives.210  Users could access the user library directory to search for music files stored on




(1) Actus reus element
The Ninth Circuit Court rejected Napster's affirmative defense that its users fairly used
the copyrighted material .2 2  As to the argument of sampling, the court found that even
though what Napster users downloaded was a full, free and permanent copy, Napster
adversely impacted audio CD and digital download markets.2 1 3 Thus, sampling did not
meet the requirements of fair use.214
With regard to the issue of space-shifting, the court held that the model of shifting in
Sony and Diamond is different from that in Napster because the music files, which are listed
on the Napster system, are available to other Naspter users, other than the single user
himself.215 Therefore, there was no fair use of space-shifting. In addition, the court
found that Napster materially contributes to infringing activities.
2 16
(2) Mens rea element
The court concluded that Napster knowingly encouraged and assisted its users to infringe
the record companies' copyrights.
217
3. Vicarious infringement
(1) Actus reus element
The court found that Napster had a direct financial interest in its users' infringing
activities.
2 18
(2) Mens rea element




The court held that Napster was liable for contributory copyright infringement only to the
210 Id., at 1012.
211 Id., at 1011.
212 Id., at 1019.
213 Id., at 1018.
214 Id.
215 Id., at 1019.
216 Id.
217 Id., at 1020-22.
218 Id., at 1023.
219 Id., at 1023-24.
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extent that Napster knew of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions or
sound recordings; knew or should have known that the files were available on the Napster
system; and failed to act to prevent the distribution of the copyrighted material.220 Furthermore,
Napster would be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement when it failed to
affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to potentially infringing
files listed in its search index.
2 2 1
Aimster
1. Type of product manufactured or service provided
The defendant operated a website to offer "Aimster," later renamed as "Madster," which
enabled his subscribers to swap digital copies.
222
2.Contributory infringement
(1) Actus reus element
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was the subscribers who made the copies of the
plaintiffs' music and that the defendant just played a role as a stock exchange, and thus that the
defendant was not a direct infringer.223 However, the court found that the defendant took
copyrighted music as an example of file-sharing in its tutorial.224  This approach constituted an
"invitation to infringement. '" 225 Thus, the court shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiffs
to the defendant; the defendant, however, failed to prove the fact that the Aimster service had
been used for a non-infringing use.
2 2 6
(2) Mens rea element
The defendant tutored subscribers on how to use the service in order to swap music files by
encryption. 227 The court held that such conduct could not shield the defendant from the actual
knowledge of illegal uses of its service.
228
3. Vicarious infringement
(1) Actus reus element
Because the defendant received monthly fees from its subscribers, the court found that its
relationship to the infringing activities of users differed from Sony's, in which television
220 Id., at 1022.
221 Id., at 1023.
222 334 F. 3d at 645.
223 Id., at 646-47.
224 Id., at 65 1.
225 Id.
226 Id., at 652-53.
227 Id., at 650.
228 Id., at 650-51.
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programs were free.
229
(2) Mens rea element
The court reasoned that the defendant failed both to diminish the encryption function and to
monitor the use of its service in order to limit users' infringing activities. 230  Thus, it could not
escape vicarious infringement liability.
231
4. The ruling
The court held the defendant liable for contributory and vicarious infringement.
232
Grokster
1. Type of product manufactured or service provided
Grokster, TreamCast, and KaZaA distributed free software that enabled users to exchange
digital media via a P2P transfer network. 233  Users of these software platforms were essentially
connected to the peer-to-peer network and were able to exchange files seamlessly.
234
2. Contributory infringement
(1) Actus reus element
The defendants' software, Morpheus, was capable of both infringing and substantial
non-infringing uses.2 35  The Ninth Circuit Court found that Grokster did not operate a centralized
file-sharing network like Napster, because Grokster no longer operated a supernode, and that
StreamCast's Gnutella was a "true" peer-to-peer network, even more decentralized than
FastTrack.236  The court concluded that there was no evidence presenting any active and
substantial contribution to the infringement.
237
(2) Mens rea element (No discussion)
3. Vicarious infringement
(1) Actus reus element
The court found that the defendants' software was free of charge.
238
(2) Mens rea element
Since there was no evidence proving that the defendants were able to police users'
infringing activities, the court concluded that the defendants had absolutely no control over the
229 Id., at 654.
230 Id., at 654-55.
231 Id., at 655.
232 Id., at 656.
233 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32.
234 Id., at1032.
235 380 F. 3d at 1161-63.
236 Id., at 1165.
237 Id., at 1160.
23' 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
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The court held that there was no contributory or vicarious liability in this case.
240
Items Product Contributory Infringement Vicarious Infringement
or Ruling
Cases Service Actus reus Meus rea Actus reus Meus rea
Sony Betamax for Time-shifting (No) (No) (No) No liability
home
recording
Diamond Rio portable Space-shifting (No) (No) (No) No liability
music players
Napster P2P file- Materially Knowingly A direct The ability to Contributory
sharing contributed to encouraged financial police for and vicarious
service the infringing and assisted interest in its infringing infringement
activities users' activities liabilities
infringing
activities
Aimster P2P Failed to prove The tutor of The monthly Failed to Contributory
file-sharing that the Aimster encryption fee was diminish the and vicarious
software had been used and actual charged. encryption infringement
for knowledge function and liabilities
non-infringing monitor the
usese use.
Grokster P2P Decentralized (No) The software No control No liability
file-sharing operation and no was free of over the
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With respect to the requirements of liability, it seems clear that the courts have been following
the consumer-practice-based policy. That is to say, while finding that most of the users employed
the issued technology for non-infringing purposes, such as time and space shifting, the courts
recognized the legitimacy of the new technology under the doctrine of fair use. Take Sony as an
example; the majority of Sony discussed the capabilities of the Betamax recorders based on the
surveys provided by parties. 241 Though the majority did not expressly put the figures into the
judgment, it can be reasonably implied that the great likelihood of time-shifting practice impacted
the judgment.
On the other hand, if the courts found that too many users exploited the new technology as
unauthorized copying tools, the courts were reluctant to immunize the providers of new
technology, especially involving the Internet. Probably because of the enormous influence of the
Internet, the courts dealt with the related issues cautiously. As a result, the courts in recent cases
have imposed a much heavier burden on technology providers. Both Aimster and Grokster
demonstrate this shift. The Seventh Circuit Court in Aimster held the defendant liable on the
ground that the Aimster service had no substantial non-infringing uses and that all users engaged in
illegal conduct. 242 However, in Grokster, the Ninth Circuit Court found that the defendants'
software had other substantial non-infringing uses. 243 Therefore, the court held that the
defendants were not liable for contributory infringement. 244 In short, these courts' decisions
depend on whether there are substantial non-infringing uses by empirical evidence of consumers'
practice.
Furthermore, the next issue is whether such trend is consistent with the Copyright Act. Sony
is the first case in which the Supreme Court reached a judgment based on the "capabilities of
machines rather than the conduct of people." 245  Both the Sony and Diamond decisions
recognized the media neutrality principle, which is consistent with the aim of the Copyright Act.
The new technologies, the Beta max video recorders and the MP3 players, have developed well
because these decisions have shielded them from infringing liability. In Sony, the plaintiffs' TV
programs were broadcasted without charge and the home-taping activities did not affect the
24' 464 U.S. at 422-24. Some commentators observed that Sony did not take the ratio of infringing and noninfringing
uses into account. See Miles, id., at 41. Their observation seems to be conflict with the holding.
242 334 F. 3d at 653.
243 380 F. 3d at 1161.
244 Id., at 1164.
245 Miles, supra note 195, at 23.
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plaintiffs' potential market.24 6 However, in the cases of P2P file sharing, the music works are not
free of charge and the file-sharing activities have negative impacts on the potential market of the
copyrighted works because the users can save the costs of buying lawful music copies by
downloading the free MP3 files. The problems resulted from P2P technology, indeed, differ from
those caused by the Betamax.
It is noticeable that in The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v.
The Canadian 'Association of Internet Providers, 2 47("SOCAN"' ) the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed the role of an Internet intermediary as a "conduit." 248 The plaintiff, SOCAN, alleged
that the defendants, a coalition of Canadian Internet service providers, ought to pay loyalties to the
plaintiff, despite the origin of the transmission of the defendants' users.24 9 The Supreme Court of
Canada held that if an Internet intermediary stayed neutral by providing "a conduit" for
information, it is immunized from the copyright infringement liability under Section 2.4(1)(b) of
the Copyright Act of Canada. 250 The Court reasoned that the fact that some users might employ
the content-neutral Internet technology to infringe copyright was not sufficient to accrue liability
to the Internet intermediary because liability required actual knowledge of the infringing
contents.
251
The above cases have concentrated on the secondary liability of the P2P providers, but have
not dealt with the issue of whether individuals' file-sharing behavior is immune from infringement
liability under the fair use principle. Some researchers contend that individuals who share MP3
online will create and transmit additional copies and that posting MP3 files online to share with
others infringes the copyright owners' rights to perform publicly.252 Some argue that the Grokster
court implied, in dicta, that file-sharing of copyrighted works was an infringing act and that fair
use cannot extend to protect the free exchange of copyrighted works by file sharing.
253
Admittedly, some users exploit P2P file-sharing technology to reproduce and distribute
246 464 U.S. at 456.
241 S.C.J. No. 44, 2004 SCC 45, File No.: 29286 [2004] 2 S.C.R.427, at <
http://www.lexisnexis.ca/ql/en/recent/scc detail.html?decision id 138 >(last visited on Jul.y 19, 2004).
248 Id., at para. 92.
249 Id., at para. 3.
250 Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act of Canada provides that those who offer the means of communication are
not infringers. Copyright Act [R.S., c. C-42].
251 SOCAN, [2004] 2 S.C.R.427, at para. 92.
252 LITMAN, supra note 12, at 161-62.253 Robert Graham Gibbons and & Christopher Scott Pennisi, The "One-By-One" Approach Toward Eliminating the
Epidemic of On-Line Music Copyright Infringement, INTELLECTUAL INTELL. PROPERTY PROP. TODAY, Features Pg. 35
(Dec. 2003).
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copyrighted works to which they have no legal right. Nevertheless, the practice of new
technology should not be the center in P2P cases. On the contrary, the neutral nature of
technology is the very point emphasized by the media neutrality doctrine. The free and open
nature of P2P matches the primary goal of the Internet. 254 Other than illegal infringing uses, P2P
technology still enables substantial non-infringing uses, such as exchanging photographs, movies,
books, texts, video, software and other digital files. The technology is employed as a tool to help
people to communicate or share information with each other. Under media neutrality, the P2P
technology providers should not be held liable for users' infringing activities.
2. Practical Application in the Two Pending Cases in Taiwan
The widespread P2P file-sharing, especially swapping copyrighted music without permission,
is also flourishing in Taiwan. 255 The two cases discussed - ezPeer and KURO - are just the tip
of the iceberg. The infringement liability of the copyright law and the practice of copyright
lawsuits in Taiwan differ from those in the U.S. The next section focuses on whether the related
cases in the U.S. could lead to some solutions to these cases in Taiwan.
The Distinguishing Features in the Copyright System and Litigation of Taiwan
The Copyright Act of Taiwan (the "Act") was enacted on May 12, 1928 and amended in 1944,
1949, 1964, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1992, 1993, 1988, 2001, 2003 and 2004.256 The Act defines a
work as a creation that is fixed in an object and that falls "within a literary, scientific, artistic, or
other intellectual domain." 257  When an author completes a work, he shall enjoy copyright
protection, 258 which includes "moral rights" and "economic rights., 259  The moral rights, which
are inalienable, 260 include the right to release a work publicly,261 the right to indication, 262 and
254 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 181. See also Fisher and & Yang, supra note 87.
255 Mon-shua Huan, Anti-Piracy Action- BSA Fighting with P2P (May 10, 2005), at <
http:!itaiwan.cnet.comnews/software/0,2000064574,20096664.00.htm> (last visited on May 10, 2005).
256 Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., Laws & Regulations: Copyright Act, supra
note 147.
217 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 3, sec. 1(1), id.; Art. 3, sec. 1(16) provides: "'Work' means a creation that is within
a literary, scientific, artistic, or other intellectual domain." Art. 3, sec. 1(16) provides: "'The original' or 'an
original' means the object to which a work is first fixed." Id.
25 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 10provides: "The author of a work shall enjoy copyright upon completion of the
work;provided, where this Act provides otherwise, such provisions shall govern." Id.
219 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 3, sec 1(3) provides: "'Copyright' means the moral rights and economic rights
subsisting in a completed work." Id.
260 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 21 provides: "Moral rights belong exclusively to the author and shall not be
transferred or succeeded." Id.
261 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 15, sec. 1 provides: "The author of a work shall enjoy the right to publicly release
the work; provided, this shall not apply to a civil servant where, pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 or 12, such
person is the author while the juristic person employing such author enjoys the economic rights to the work." Id.
262 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 16, sec I provides: "The author of a work shall have the right to indicate its name, a
pseudonym, or no name on the original or copies of the work, or when the work is publicly released. The author has
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the right of reputation. 263  The economic rights embrace exclusive rights: to reproduce, 264 to
recite a work publicly, 265 to broadcast a work publicly, 266 to present an audiovisual work
publicly,267 to perform oral and literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works publicly,
268
to transmit a work publicly,269 to display a work publicly,270 to adopt a work into derivative work;
to compile a work into a compilation work,27 1 to distribute the original or copies of a work,272 to
rent a work,273 and to import the original or copies of a work.2 74  Generally speaking, the
duration of economic rights is from creation until 70 years after the author's death. 275  "Economic
rights for photographic works, audiovisual works, sound recordings, and performances endure for
fifty years after the public release of the work.
' 276
The subject matter of copyright encompasses: (1) oral and literary works, (2) musical works,
(3) dramatic and choreographic works, (4) artistic works, (5) photographic works, (6) pictorial
and graphical works, (7) audiovisual works, (8) sound recordings, (9) architectural works, and (10)
computer programs. 277  "The following items shall not be the subject matter of copyright: (1) the
constitution, acts, regulations, or official documents; (2) translations or compilations by central or
the same right to a derivative work based on its work." Id.
263 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 17 provides: "The author has the right to prohibit others from distorting,
mutilating, modifying, or otherwise changing the content, form, or name of the work, thereby damaging the author's
reputation." Id.
264 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 22, sec 1 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors have the
exclusive right to reproduce their works." Id.
265 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art.23 provides: "Authors of oral and literary works have the exclusive right to
publicly recite their works." Id.
266 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 24, sec I provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors have the
exclusive right to publicly broadcast their works." Id.
267 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 25 provides: "Authors of audiovisual works have the exclusive right to publicly
present their works." Id.
268 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 26, sec 1 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors of oral and
literary, musical, and dramatic/choreographic works have the exclusive right to publicly perform their works." Id.
269 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 26bis, sec. 1 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors of works
have the exclusive right of public transmission of their works." Id.
270 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 27 provides: "Authors of unpublished fine arts or photographic works have the
exclusive right to publicly display the original and copies of their works." Id.
271 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 28 provides: "Authors of works have the exclusive right to adapt their works into
derivative works or to compile their works into compilation works; provided, this shall not apply to performances."
272 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 28bis, sec. I provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors of works
have the exclusive right to distribute their works through transfer of ownership." Id.
273 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 29, sec I provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, authors of works have
the exclusive right to rent their works." Id.
274 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 87, sec 1(4) provides: "Any of the following circumstances, except as otherwise
provided under this Act, shall be deemed an infringement of copyright or plate rights: 4. Import of the original or any
copies of a work without the authorization of the economic rights holder." Id.
275 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 5, sec. 1 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, economic rights
endure for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death." Id.
276 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 34, sec. 1. Id.
277 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 5, sec. 1. Id.
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local government agencies of works referred to in the preceding subparagraph; (3) slogans and
common symbols, terms, formulas, numerical charts, forms, notebooks, or almanacs; (4) oral and
literary works for news reports that are intended strictly to communicate facts; and (5) test
questions and alternative test questions from all kinds of examinations held pursuant to acts or
regulations.
278
Article 65, Subsection 1, of the Act provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work does
not infringe the copyright owner's economic rights. 279 When determining whether an
unauthorized use of a work conforms to Article 44 to 63 or constitutes fair use, courts must
conduct an all-facts-and-circumstances test. 280 The courts consider the following four factors in
particular: (1) the purpose of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use.
2 8 1
Under the Copyright Act of Taiwan, copyright infringers are subject to civil liabilities and
criminal penalties. 282  Chapter VI (Remedies for Infringement of Rights) of the Copyright Act of
Taiwan 283 addresses remedies for infringement of rights. Chapter VII (Penal Provisions) of the
Copyright Act of Taiwan 284 contains penal provisions. Copyright owners can demand that
infringers prevent and remove the infringement (Art. 84).285 If the copyright owners' moral rights
are infringed, copyright owners can claim damages, including a commensurate amount of
compensation, and appropriate measures necessary for the restoration of their reputation (Art.
28685). Copyright owners may request the destruction or other necessary disposition of
infringing goods or articles used predominantly for the infringing acts (Art. 88bis).2 87  After the
trial of the infringement case, copyright owners may demand that the infringer publish all or part
278 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 9, sec. 1. Id.
279 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 65, sec 1. Id.
280 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 65, sec 2. Id.
211 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 65, sec 2 provides: "In determining whether the exploitation of a work complies with
the provisions ofArticles 44 through 63, or other conditions of fair use, all circumstances shall be taken into account,
and in particular the following facts shall be noted as the basis for determination:
1. The purposes and nature of the exploitation, including whether such exploitation is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.
2. The nature of the work.
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion exploited in relation to the work as a whole.
4. Effect of the exploitation on the work's current and potential market value." Id.
282 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts. 84 to 103. Id.
283 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts. 84 to 90quarter. Id.
284 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts. 91 to 103. Id.
285 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 84. Id.
286 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 85. Id.
287 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 88bis. Id.
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of the judgment (Art. 89).288
Infringing behaviors include several kinds of criminal conduct: (1) reproducing, distributing,
publicly displaying the work; (2) possessing the work with intent to distribute; (3) infringing by
means of public recitation, public broadcast, public presentation, public performance, public
transmission, public display, adaptation, compilation, or leasing; (4) making a living from the
criminal infringement; (5) selling copies of sound recordings outside of the territory; (6)
distributing, publicly displaying or possessing infringing articles; (7) importing copies reproduced
without authorization; (8) exploiting an infringing copy of a computer program for business
purposes; (9) altering the program not for backup or the owner's personal use; (10) not providing a
clear indication of the source of the work; (11) unlawfully removing or altering the electronic
rights management information.289 The penalties are imprisonment and/or fine (Art. 91 to 103).290
There are no legal concepts of contributory and vicarious infringement in Taiwan. Paragraph
1, Article 185 of the Civil Code of Taiwan provides: "If several people have caused an injure to
another person by a wrongful act committed in common, they are jointly liable for the damage.
291
The same rule applies if it cannot be discovered which of several participants has caused the
damage."292Paragraph 2, Article 185 provides: " Instigators and accomplices are deemed to be
jointdoers." 293 The elements of serving as an accomplice are the following: (1) a tort of a third
party, (2) an intent to aid, and (3) providing aids to the third party.2 94 Broadly speaking, the
concept of serving as an accomplice under Paragraph 2, Article 185 is similar to the concept of
contributory infringement.
In addition, Paragraph 1, Article 188 of the Civil Code of Taiwan provides: "The employer is
jointly liable to make compensation for any damage which the employee wrongfully causes to the
rights of another person in the performance of his duties. However, the employer is not liable for
the damages if he has exercised reasonable care in the selection of the employee, and in the
superintendence of the duties, or if the damage would have been occasioned notwithstanding the
exercise of such reasonable care." 295 The elements of employee' torts are the following: (1) a
288 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art 89. Id.
289 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts 91 to 103. Id.
290 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts 91 to 103. Id.
291 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 185, para. 1. JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, Major Statutes of the Republic of China,
Volume (II) 34 (June 1992).
292 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 185, para. 2. Id.
293 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 185. Id.
294 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 185. Id.
295 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 188. Id., at 35.
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tort of an employee, (2) the employee's performance within the scope of his or her employment,
and (3) the ability to supervise the employee's performance. 296  Therefore, the employer's
liability for the employee's torts under Paragraph 1, Article 188 is similar to the concept of
vicarious infringement.
In Taiwan, those who infringe copyright must incur the civil and criminal liabilities.
297
Plaintiffs in civil proceedings bear the burden of proof, including the ownership of copyright, the
infringing activities of defendants, and the actual damage incurred from the infringing
activities. 298  Sometimes, the burden is too heavy for private parties to carry. Prosecutors,
however, due to the authority they hold, must take full responsibility for demonstrating infringing
activities of defendants. 299  Because people in Taiwan tend not to enter into litigious proceedings,
particularly criminal ones, most infringers are willing to settle with copyright owners. As far as
copyright owners are concerned, criminal lawsuits are a better alternative. Due to the heavy
burden of proof, copyright owners in criminal procedings can achieve the goal of protecting
copyright with less time and cost.
The Outline of the Indictments3
0 0
The prosecutors detailed the features of the ezPeer and KURO operations in light of
technology.30 1 According to the indictments, the operation of ezPeer and KURO is similar to that
of Napster and Aimster.30 2 All of them are technically classified as "the Modified P2P System."
Nevertheless, there are two differences among these four cases. First, Napster was held liable for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. Aimster was considered a contributory
infringer. EzPeer and KURO, however, were accused of direct copyright infringement liability.
Secondly, in Napster and Aimster, the plaintiffs only brought suit against P2P service providers,
while in ezPeer and KURO, the accused defendants include not only the owners of the websites,
but also the end users (members).
The defendants in ezPeer and KURO argue that there are no files uploaded or downloaded in
296 Civil Code of Taiwan, art 188. Id.
297 Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts. 84 to 90quarter provide the civil liabilities. Copyright Act of Taiwan, arts. 91 to
103 provide the criminal liabilities. See Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., Laws &
Regulations: Copyright Act, supra note 147.
298 Civil Procedure Code of Taiwan, art 277.
299 Crim. Procedure Code of Taiwan, art 161.
301 Unlike the U.S., prosecutors in Taiwan must file an information including facts of and evidence for the offense
and article of the law violated. Criminal Procedure Code of Taiwan, art. 264. (Article 264 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Taiwan). See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 291,., at 487.
301 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
302 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
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the web servers, and that they, just like search engines, only provide P2P software and platforms
for members to exchange members' own files. They also argue that they neither have knowledge
about members' conduct nor have the right or ability to monitor any content of members' files.
Their most critical defense is that the software can be employed legally to share various files and
that their activities should be shielded under the principle of technology neutrality.
30 3
The defendants are accused of direct infringement-reproducing and publicly transmitting
copyrighted works with intent to make a living from copyright infringement. 30 4 Such an intent is
not disputed because ezPeer and KURO charge monthly fees.30 5 In addition, those who actually
engage in reproducing and transmitting copyrighted works are members of ezPeer and KURO,
rather than the actual owners of the websites. 30 6 However, the relationship between the owners of
the websites and the accused members is not clear. From the context of the indictments, instead
of accusing defendants under the theory of soliciting 30 7 and abetting, 30 8 the prosecutors could
have directly accused them under the conspiracy theory. 30 9 It is a noticeable feature in the
indictments.
The Proposals to the ezPeer and KURO Cases
Even though the owners and some members of ezPeer and KURO have been indicted, some
problems still remain unclear and need to be overcome. The following section outlines the
problems and makes proposals from the perspectives of the prosecutors, the defendants, the court
and public policy.
A. The Prosecutors' Perspective
Unlike Aimster, a civil suit, the defendants in ezPeer and KURO in the criminal procedure do
not need to prove the non-infringing uses of their P2P software.310  Conversely, prosecutors bear
the burden to prove the defendants have committed the copyright infringement. 311 Moreover,
because the prosecutors accused the defendants of direct infringement, the prosecutors must
303 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
304 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
305 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
306 ezPeer, The Indictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
307 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 29, para. I provides: "A person who incites another to commit an offense is an
solicitor." See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 291, at 362.
301 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 30, para. 1 provides: "A person who aids another in the commission of a crime is an
abettor notwithstanding that the person aided does not know of such assistance." See id.
309 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 28 provides: "Each of two or more persons acting jointly in the commission of an
offense is a principal offender of the conspiracy." See id.
311 Only procesutors carry the burden of proof. Crim. Procedure Code of Taiwan, art. 161.
311 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art 161 provides: "The public prosecutor shall bear the burden of proof as to the facts of
the crime charged of an accused." See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 29 1, at 467.
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demonstrate that members of ezPeer and KURO commit infringement, and that the owners of
ezPeer and KURO knowingly and willfully acquiesced in the illegal behavior of their members
("direct intent") and then jointly acted in the commission of the infringement.
312
The prosecutors accused the owners of ezPeer and KURO mainly based on the existence of the
directory indexes or database and the necessity of ezPeer and KURO in the connection between
members. 313  However, in spite that the owners of ezPeer and KURO established directory
indexes or database in the servers and that members cannot link and exchange files with each other
without ezPeer and KURO, the prosecutors carry a difficult burden of proof because it is not easy
to tell the exact content or uses of downloaded files merely based on the file size.
Instead of "direct intent" under Paragraph 1, Article 13 of the Criminal Code,314 an alternative
available to the prosecutors is "indirect intent" under Paragraph 2, Article 13 of the Criminal
Code. 315 If the defendants foresaw the consequence of copyright infringement and such
consequence was not contrary to their will, there existed "indirect intent." For example, the
owners of ezPeer and KURO posted an announcement on their websites telling members that
members do not violate the Copyright Act if they, without the intent to profit, just upload and
download a few MP3 music files. 316 EzPeer and KURO told members that they could do so under
the fair use doctrine and the recently amended Copyright Act.317 An announcement like this
would lead to the conclusion that the owners were familiar with the related criminal
responsibilities of copyright infringement and that they might have idea about what members are
312 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 28. Id., at 362.
313 ezPeer, The lindictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
314 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 13, para. 1 provides: "An act is committed intentionally if the actor knowingly and
willfully causes the accomplishment of the constitute elements of an offense." See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN,
supra note 291, at 359-60.
315 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 13, para. 2 provides: "An act is considered to have been committed intentionally if the
actor foresaw that the act would accomplish the constitute elements of an offense and such accomplishment was not
contrary to his will." See id., at 360.
316 EzPeer, Legal Issues, at < http://peer7.ezpeer.com/sw/service/01.htm > (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004); KURO,
Copyright Statement, at <http://m6-idx-web-tp-O1 .music.com.tw/kiuro m6/m6 stopifashionow.htnm > (last visited on
Dec. 19, 2004).
317 EzPeer, supra note 316 ; KURO, supra note 316.. Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 91, para. 2 provides: "A person
who infringes on the economic rights of another person by means of reproducing the work without the intent to profit,
where the number of copies reproduced exceeds five, or where the total amount of infringement calculated by the
market value of lawful copies of the work at the time of seizure exceeds thirty thousand New Taiwan Dollars, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than three years, detention, or in lieu thereof or in addition thereto a fee of
not more than seven hundred and fifty thousand New Taiwan Dollars." However, this article was amended on Sep.
1, 2004: " A person who infringes on the economic rights of another person by means of reproducing the work
without authorization with the intent to sell or rent shall be imprisoned not less than six months and not more than five
years, and in addition thereto, may be fined not less than two hundred thousand and not more than two million New
Taiwan Dollars." Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 92, para. 2, Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, R.O.C., Laws & Regulations: Copyright Act, supra note 147.
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doing with the software they provide.
Furthermore, the posted copyright announcement indicates that the owners of ezPeer and
KURO were able to predict the infringing uses of their software. Nevertheless, the owners
allowed and, even gave legal advices to members to exchange music files without permission,
rather than tried to stop the possible infringement. 318  Thus, the consequences of infringing
copyrighted music works were not contrary the owners' will. Moreover, the user's instruction on
the KURO website explicitly teaches users how to use KURO to search the desired music files.
319
Such an instruction would be evidence to support the finding of indirect intent. Hence, the
owners of ezPeer and KURO can be considered to have intentionally committed infringement.
B. The Defendants' Perspective
The defendants in the criminal trials, including the owners of the ezPeer and KURO websites
and the users of the ezPeer and KURO software, have the right to remain silent and bear no
burden of proving their innocence. Several defenses are available to defendants as well.
Users can use the ezPeer and KURO software to upload and download music files. The
liabilities of the users who uploaded music files ("uploaders") differ from those of the users who
downloaded music files ("downloaders") due to the various content of their activities. The
uploaders who uploaded music files without copyright owners' permission infringed copyright
owners' rights to reproduce, 320 to distribute 321 and to transmit a work publicly under the
Copyright Act of Taiwan. 322  They may invoke fair use, pursuant to which the courts must
consider all circumstances as well as the four factors set forth in Article 65, Subsection 1 of the Act
as set forth above.
Because they shared their music files without charge, their use of the copyrighted music works
318 EzPeer, supra note 316; KURO, supra note 316.
319 Kuro, User s Instruction, at <http://sos.music.com.tw/help index.htm> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
320 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 3, sec. 1(5) provides: "'Reproduce' means to reproduce directly, indirectly,
permanently, or temporarily a work by means of printing, reprography, sound recording, video recording,
photography, handwritten notes, or otherwise. This definition also applies to the sound recording or video recording
of scripts, musical works, or works of similar nature during their performance or broadcast, and also includes the
construction of an architectural structure based on architectural plans or models." Intellectual Property Office, supra
note 147.
321 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 3, sec 1(12) provides: "'Distribution' means, with or without compensation, to
provide the original of a work, or a copy thereof, to the public for the purpose of trade or circulation." Id.
322 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 3, sec 1(10) provides: "'Public transmission' means to make available or
communicate to the public the content of a work through sounds or images by wire or wireless network, or through
other means of communication, including enabling the public to receive the content of such work by any of the above
means at a time or place individually chosen by them." Id.
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was for a non-commercial purpose. If the uploaders actually owned lawful copies of the music
files, they may contend that their file-sharing activities were "reasonable and customary,"
analogizing their actions to people who buy music tapes or CDs and who would like to lend the
tapes or CDs to their family and friends free of charge.323 The courts, however, may hold that
because the uploaders made the music files accessible to thousands of downloaders on the Internet,
the magnitude of P2P file-sharing activities went far beyond the "reasonable" level. If the
uploaders did not even own lawful copies of the downloaded and transmitted music, on the other
hand, their non-commercial uses could hardly be deemed reasonable.
Because of their original and creative nature, musical works enjoy more copyright protection
than factual works. 324 The uploaders must upload the whole file for downloaders to be able to
download and listen to the music. More importantly, the uploaders' file-sharing activities would
cause substantial harms to the copyright owners' potential music market because downloaders
could save the cost of buying new original music copies by downloading music files via P2P.
Such activities clearly interfere with the copyright owners' entering the MP3 market. Thus, only
the first factor, the purpose of the use, will favor the uploaders, while the other three will weigh
against them. The courts may determine that there was no fair use and that the uploaders
infringed the copyright.
As for the downloaders, they might infringe copyright owners' rights to reproduce and to
distribute. The best defense for them is fair use on the ground of non-commercial personal use.
If the downloaders owned lawful music copies, they can argue that the music files downloaded
were "space-shifted" from their lawful copies to the computers in order to enjoy the music
anywhere based on the Diamond case. 32 5 Yet, on the other hand, if the downloaders did not own
any lawful copies, the courts may rule that their downloading did not constitute fair use because
the second to fourth factors, that is, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and the portion
used, and the effect of the use, weigh against the downloaders just like the they do against the
uploaders, as discussed above.
With respect to the owners of the ezPeer and KURO websites, how ezPeer and KURO operate
is definitely the key point in the pending trials. If the ezPeer and KURO websites were indeed
323 In Sony, Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (464 U.S. 417, 451, (1984)and Harper & Row
Publ'n, Inc. v. National Enterprise, (471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985), the Supreme Court held that if the users' purposes
were non-commercial, the finding of fair use would favor the secondary user. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994). (stating that a commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use).)
324 Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1991).
325 Diamond, 180 F. 3d at 1079.
5 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 83
Copyright © 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
decentralized systems, the owners may argue that they neither have control over the swapping of
users, nor own the ability to monitor or eliminate potential infringement. Due to the charge of
direct infringement and the difficulty of proving the existence of direct intent, the strategy of the
owners had better focus on the defenses emanating from the decentralized structure.
In addition, the user's guide lists several types of files, which can be swapped via ezPeer, such
as music, documents, pictures, images, and websites.326 Thus, the owners of the ezPeer website
may argue that its software has other substantial non-infringing uses. Moreover, KURO has
developed a new friend-finding function, by which members can make friends and chat with each
other and exchange photos and diaries online. 327 This is a strong argument for KURO because
this function constitutes a substantial non-infringing use for KURO.
The tough problem exists in the announcements of the related copyright liability posted on the
websites. The content of the announcements can hardly be interpreted as an ordinary copyright
statement, which merely reminds users not to break copyright laws. What the defendants can
argue is that they merely suggest their members upload and download under the restriction of the
Copyright Act. This argument is highly unpersuasive, however, because the best defenses
should focus on the decentralized feature of operation and the substantial non-infringing uses.
C. The Court's Perspective
Some researchers think the technology-centric analysis would raise unsolved issues. 328 The
direct and secondary infringement, however, involve the judgment of the meus rea element both in
civil and criminal procedures. In reality, determining an actor's intent is always an obstacle in a
trial. Demonstrating how technology works not only provides a clue in proving the direct or
indirect intent of the owners of the file-sharing websites, but also relates to the application of
media neutrality.
With regard to the defendants' argument about technology neutrality, the prosecutors
contended that this principle only applies to the legislative or policy-making aspect. 329
Admittedly, when making copyright laws or policy regarding technology, lawmakers or
decision-makers must be neutral. Nevertheless, the technology neutrality doctrine should not be
326 EzPeer, User's Guide, at < http://peer7.ezpeer.com sw/guide/03.htm> (last visited on Dec. 19, 2004).
327 KURO, Making Friends, at <http://counter.kuro.com.tw/AD/friend/ad friend.asp > (last visited on Dec. 19,
2004).
321 Professor Tussey contended that judicial technology-centered approach would constitute uncertainty in the
outcome of future cases, along with a chilling effect on innovation. See Tussey, supra note 58, at 34-35.
329 ezPeer, The lindictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The Iindictment, supra note 152.
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construed too narrowly. In determining the liability of the intermediary in copyright infringement,
as long as the intermediary remains neutral, it can raise the technology or media neutrality
principle as a defense.
Because the owners of ezPeer and KURO were accused of direct copyright infringement, the
courts cannot expand the scope of the trial beyond the claims alleged in the complaint. 330  The
elements of the direct infringement are (1) mens rea element: direct intent; and (2) actus reus
element: infringing copyright by the means of reproducing and publicly transmitting. 331 Under
the conspiracy theory, the additional element is joint action in the commission of an offence,
332
even though the owners of ezPeer and KURO do not actually engage in the reproduction and
transmission of copyrighted works. 333  Consequently, the court may investigate whether the
structure of ezPeer and KURO is server-centered or decentralized in order to determine the extent
to which the owners get involved in reproducing and transmitting members' MP3 files. If the
servers of ezPeer and KURO play a significant role in the connection of members as in MP3.com,
Napster or Aimster, the court should reject ezPeer's and KURO's arguments that they have no
infringing intent.
On the other hand, if the court finds the feature of decentralization, as in Grokster and KaZaA,
the court should take the principle of media neutrality into account. In other words, if ezPeer and
KURO merely function as a conduit of the transmission of files, the technology remains neutral.
Thus, it is unreasonable to ask the intermediary to supervise or police any transmitted content of
members due to the high transaction cost. Moreover, under this scenario, P2P technology and the
Internet would be developing with very lax control. Therefore, the owners of ezPeer and KURO
should not bear any responsibility for the infringement of their members.
D. The Public Policy Perspective
The development of computer technology advances distribution of information and data with
features of "fidelity", "facility" and "ubiquity." 334 P2P technology is a useful tool for transmitting
information in digital formats. With P2P technology, the public can easily access more
copyrighted works than ever before, and thus ignite more creative sparks. This is precisely the
330 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 268 provides: "A court shall not try a crime for which prosecution has not initiated."
See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 291, at 488.
331 Copyright Act of Taiwan, art. 91. See Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., Laws
& Regulations: Copyright Act, supra note 147.
332 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 28. See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 291, at 362.
333 Crim. Code of Taiwan, art. 28. See JUDICIAL YUAN OF TAIWAN, supra note 291, at 362. As to the operation of
ezPeer and KURO, see ezPeer, The Iindictment, supra note 137. Kuro, The lindictment, supra note 152.
334 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 163.
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goal of media neutrality. However, many users use P2P technology as an infringing tool, by
which they upload and download copyrighted music files without copyright owners' permission.
They always defend arguing that personal use is shielded under fair use. Such an argument
over-simplifies the complex issue because mere non-commercial personal use is not sufficient to
justify their infringing activities.
A copyrighted work generates no revenues until it is distributed on the market. Directing
copyrighted works into related markets has been the principle of copyright since the Statute of
Anne.335 If a copyrighted work cannot be distributed efficiently, the public will lose opportunities
to access the copyrighted work, and future works will decrease. In order to promote authors'
intelligent ideas in physical product markets, media with advanced technology are a critical bridge
between authors and the public. Without media's involvement, authors have difficulties
distributing their intelligent ideas to the public. By the same token, the public has limited access
to copyrighted works. Media connect authors to the public by allowing authors to know what the
public prefers and create future works based on that knowledge.
336
The incentive to distribute is as important as the incentive to create. The Copyright Act
attempts to strike a sophisticated balance between the two. If technology providers can fully
develop new forms of media or technology without copyright infringement liability, they can
provide the public more advanced tools. Such balance serves the interests of the public. In the
case of P2P technology, if the courts rule that the owners of P2P websites are liable, the decisions
will defer the progress of new technology. In the end, the owners will shift their transaction costs
to customers or users. Such negative consequences are certainly unacceptable to the public
because they run afoul of the primary purpose of the copyright system-to maximize the most
various and diverse expression while incurring minimal costs. 337  Therefore, media neutrality
as technology neutrality should be at the center of new technology issues.
F The Approach to New Technology Issues
On the one hand, copyright owners need economic incentives to continue their creation and
the public cannot just enjoy the owners' music free of charge. On the other hand, the public,
especially future authors, also needs more access to copyrighted works. In dealing with new
technology issues, understanding how the technology works is critical. Some scholars contend
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that the "technology-centered" method is not a good solution.338  However, because in
determining secondary liability or direct copyright infringement (criminal liability), the courts
have to determine whether the technology provider has knowledge of users' infringement or intent
of infringement, the operation of P2P websites is significant evidence to determine the existence
of these mens rea elements. For instance, the following aspects of the technology are important:
(1) The User Management System-- Does a user have to register or log in the system before he
uses the technology?
339
(2) The Relationship between the Technology Provider and the User - Do they come into contact
only at the time the service is provided?
3 40
(3) The Scope of Licensing - Is there any licensing agreement? Does the technology provider
reserve the right to block the user who infringes copyright or to terminate the user's account?
341
(4) The Structure of the Service Provided - Are the swapped files stored in the server? 342 Does
the service provider operate an index of shared files?3 43 Does the disconnection between the
technology provider and the user interrupt any transmission? 344 Can the technology provider
alter the software in the user's computer? 345 Does the technology provider offer an "integrated
service" including "the site and facilities"? 346  Are there any substantial non-infringing uses
for the technology?
3 47
(5) The Instruction of the Service - Does the technology provider only take music files as an
example? 348 Does the technology provider teach users to use encryption to avoid the judgment
of the actual knowledge? 349 Does the technology provider emphasize the potential infringing
usage?
350
338 Tussey, supra note 58, at 30-35.
339 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165.
341 Sony, 464 U.S. at 438.
341 Napster, 293 F.3d at 1023-24; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165.
342 Aimster, 334 F. 3d at 647-48; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
343 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
344 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
345 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163-64.
346 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165.
347 Sony, 464 US at 442.
348 Aimster, 334 F. 3d at 651-52.
349 Aimster, 334 F. 3d at 651.
310 Sony, 464 U.S. at 438.
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(6) The Revenue Source - Is the service free of charge? Does any revenue finance the operation
of the service?
35'
With regard to the line between neutrality and technology providers' liabilities, as long as the
technology stays neutral, the technology provider who plays the role of conduit has no secondary
liability for copyright infringement under the media neutrality principle. However, the
technology provider who participates in the infringing activity and meets the elements of
secondary liability should be held liable for users' direct infringement. For example, if the
technology provider addresses how to use the technology for a potential infringing use in
advertisements or users' guides, he should not be shielded under media neutrality.
Conclusion
Sometimes technology seems to be a threat to copyright, but it is likely to become a
protective tool for copyright. In a digital world, the most urgent concern about copyright is the
issue of what the public is entitled to under the fair use doctrine and whether new technology
changes the scope of copyright. Information constitutes societal wealth and belongs to all
citizens. 3 52 Technology, which keeps information accessible to the public, is neutral in all
circumstances, including copyright matters. 3 3 Under the media neutrality principle, there is no
need to enact another statute to regulate copyright disputes regarding the Internet.
In order to enforce the Copyright Act, the infringement, undoubtedly, must be forbidden.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of reproducing copyrighted works by P2P file-sharing causes us to
rethink of the value and goal of copyright. The convenient and speedy characteristic of P2P file
sharing technology has become a worldwide practice in the Internet. Making good use of the
technology will broaden the opportunity of access to copyrighted works and innovative production.
If the courts punish the operators of P2P file-sharing service, P2P file-sharing technology will
decrease. Such a consequence is not only unacceptable to the public, but it also runs afoul of the
ultimate purpose of the Copyright Act-to promote the progress of science and useful art.
Copyright owners should cooperate with P2P file-sharing technology, rather than suppress the
development of it.
How society views copyright in the digital age is more important. Just like Professor
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Lawrence Lessig said, the law over-protects copyright owners and the future focus on the Internet
will be "copy-duty"-copyright owners have a duty to make their works publicly accessible.
354
The doctrine of media neutrality behind the Copyright Act and Sony will certainly keep
copyrighted works available to the public.
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